This article assesses insurance uptake in three community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes located in rural parts of two of India's poorest states and offered through women's self-help groups (SHGs). We examine what drives uptake, the degree of inclusive practices of the schemes and the influence of health status on enrolment. The most important finding is that a household's socio-economic status does not appear to substantially inhibit uptake. In some cases scheduled caste/scheduled tribe households are more likely to enrol. Second, households with greater financial liabilities find insurance more attractive. Third, access to the national hospital insurance scheme Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana does not dampen CBHI uptake, suggesting that the potential for greater development of insurance markets and products beyond existing ones would respond to a need. Fourth, recent episodes of illness and self-assessed health status do not influence uptake. Fifth, insurance coverage is prioritized within households, with the household head, the spouse of the household head and both male and female children of the household head, more likely to be insured as compared with other relatives. Sixth, offering insurance through women's SHGs appears to mitigate concerns about the inclusiveness and sustainability of CBHI schemes. Given the pan-Indian spread of SHGs, offering insurance through such groups offers the potential to scale-up CBHI.
Introduction
Outpatient care represents the lion's share of health-care spending among resource-poor rural persons in India (Dror et al. 2008) , and most of that cost is borne by health-care seekers outof-pocket (OOP) (Selvaraj and Karan 2012; World Bank 2010a; Meghan 2010; WHO 2012) . High OOP expenditure has been identified as a factor driving vulnerable households further into poverty (WHO 2000) . The impoverishing effects of such expenditures in the Indian context have been highlighted by Berman et al. (2010) ; Shahrawat and Rao 2011 and Garg and Karan (2009) . Binnendijk et al. (2012) have shown that households in question frequently finance such OOP spending by borrowing money with interest or selling assets, even for outpatient care, and this practice increases total OOP spending significantly. To reduce the inequity of such health financing (Kruk et al. 2009) , it is now commonly agreed that risk pooling and prepayment should replace OOP spending when seeking care (James and Savedoff 2010; World Bank 2010b) . In India, in 2008, the government has introduced a hospitalization insurance scheme called Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) which, for the time being, is heavily subsidized and open for affiliation mainly to persons confirmed as 'belowpoverty-line' (BPL). This scheme notwithstanding, health insurance mostly does not cover the cost of outpatient care and penetration is still low (Ma and Sood 2008) . 1 The combined effect of excluding most outpatient care from health insurance, and general concerns of clients that they might not get suitable returns from insurance due to their inability to enforce the contract may explain the low penetration of health insurance (Dror and Vellakkal 2012) .
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Since the late 1990s, community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes at village level have been proposed as an alternative approach to increase access to insurance, replacing informal risk-pooling approaches. Special attention was drawn to CBHI that involved clients in establishing rationing rules and governing schemes (Dror and Jacquier 1999; WHO 2000; Wiesmann and Jutting 2001; Ahuja 2005; NCMH 2005 ; ILO/ STEP 2006; Bhat and Jain 2006; UNDP 2007; Dror et al. 2009 ). This has led to the implementation of a number of CBHI schemes in several developing countries, including India Gautham et al. 2011). 3 Matching the roll-out of these schemes, there has been a proliferation of studies on various aspects, e.g. uptake, utilization of health care, financial protection and impact of such schemes (Gumber 2001; Ranson 2001; Jutting 2004; Msuya et al. 2004; Chankova et al. 2008; Zhang and Wang 2008; Axelson et al. 2009; Gnawali et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Ito and Kono 2010; Thornton et al. 2010; Bendig and Arun 2011; Robyn et al. 2012 ). An early review was provided by and Preker et al. (2002) who concluded, based on 45 papers they reviewed, that there was convincing evidence that CBHI schemes were able to mobilize resources to finance health-care needs, albeit with substantial variation across schemes, and to reach low-income groups, although often not the very lowest-income groups. Ekman (2004) who carried out a systematic review of 36 studies published from 1980 to 2002, concluded that while such schemes provide financial protection for low-income groups, the magnitude of the effect is small and the lowest-income groups are excluded from enrolment. More recently, Mebratie et al. (2012 Mebratie et al. ( ) reviewed 36 papers (published between 1995 Mebratie et al. ( and 2011 that dealt with the determinants of CBHI uptake and, more specifically, social exclusion and adverse selection. They reported that most papers provide evidence that the lowestincome groups are excluded from CBHI schemes. They also reported that about 86% of the studies find that individuals suffering from pre-existing health conditions/poor health were more likely to join CBHI schemes as compared with those in good health, suggesting this is a proxy of adverse selection.
The purpose of this study is to examine and identify factors that drive enrolment in CBHI schemes launched in three rural locations (one in Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh, one in Kanpur Dehat, Uttar Pradesh and the third in Vaishali, Bihar) in India in 2010-11. This project is innovative in several aspects. First, households can enrol only through their female members who participate in a women's self-help group (SHG).
4 While focusing on SHG-affiliated households limits the generalizability of our estimates, in so far as women participating in SHG are usually from lower-income households, 5 we examine whether this enrolment strategy improves inclusiveness by offering resource-poor households non-competitive access to the CBHI schemes. Second, considering that the selection rule for membership (female participation in SHG) is unrelated to pre-existing medical conditions, does the evidence support the assumption that this affiliation strategy reduces the likelihood of adverse selection? Third, considering that the SHG women may enrol either alone or with other members of their household (but the others can only enrol if the SHG woman is enrolled), we examine intra-household resource allocation decisions relating to payment of insurance premiums. Fourth, notwithstanding the fact that the same enrolment rule applied to all three CBHI implementations, we observe variations in uptake, and assess the effect of some differences in design on enrolment.
The article unfolds by providing, in the section 'Methods', a description of the three CBHI schemes and a discussion of the data. This is followed by a discussion section of our analytical framework. The next section contains the empirical results. The final section of the article contains conclusions.
Methods
Household Scheme description, scheme uptake and data
The target group is defined as households with at least one woman registered as a member of an SHG in March 2010 (when the baseline study was conducted). The target group for the entire project consisted of 3686 SHG households (1284 in Pratapgarh, 1039 in Kanpur Dehat and 1363 in Vaishali) representing a total of 23 876 individuals (8933 in Pratapgarh, 7105 in Kanpur Dehat and 7838 in Vaishali).
Each of the CBHI schemes has been designed as a cluster randomized controlled trial (Doyle et al. 2011) and follows a three-wave implementation process. Each cluster is designed to contain an equal number of SHG-affiliated households and subsequently, each cluster is randomly assigned to one of the three waves of treatment. In each wave, one-third of clusters receive treatment (i.e. are offered to join the CBHI). This study is based on data relating to the SHG households that joined in The two states where the CBHI schemes are located, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar, are among India's most populated, poorest and least urbanized and display large gender differences. 6 All three CBHI sites are located in rural areas, about 75 km from the nearest urban centres (Figure 1) . At all locations, the project was implemented by the Delhibased Micro Insurance Academy (MIA) in co-operation with a local non-governmental organization (NGO) or an implementing partner which has well-established relations with the SHGs. 7 In each location, the CBHI implementation followed MIA's four-phase process (initiating, involving, launch and post-launch) (Dror et al. 2013 ) that includes awareness building, insurance education, initial package design and premium pricing based on information obtained from a baseline survey, modification of package design and premium-setting on the basis of interactions with the SHGs during benefit option consultation workshops, and finally training of SHG members to manage the scheme ('creation of a local ground structure'). Following insurance education, the SHG members participated in benefit-package design through discussions within their family and at the SHG, in the form of a simulation game called CHAT (Choosing Health-plans All Together). 8 The activities
were focused on female SHG members who were expected to spread information within their households and subsequently lead to enrolment of all household members in the scheme. In practice, while insurance was offered to an entire household, only some household members enrolled. Baseline data from all eligible households were gathered during Details on the benefit package selected at each CBHI scheme site are provided in Table 1 . The packages in Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat are similar except that SHGs in Pratapgarh do not opt for coverage of outpatient care. Based on field experience it seems that SHGs in Pratapgarh appear to be more confident in being able to meet outpatient care expenses through OOP. SHGs in Vaishali district, which is relatively poorer as compared with the two districts in UP, opted not to include coverage of inpatient care. This may well be due to the relatively high enrolment in RSBY which covers BPL households (48%, as compared with 18% and 15%, respectively in Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat; see Table 2 ).
During the first wave of implementation, 525 households or 39% of the targeted households had at least one household member who was enrolled in the scheme (the corresponding number of individuals was 1806, or an enrolment rate of 23%). These figures translate into an insurance coverage of about 3.44 (1806/525) members per insured household. Given the average household size of 5.78 this implies that conditional on enrolment, 60% of a household is covered.
A closer look reveals considerable variation in enrolment across the three locations, ranging from 29% of households (15% of the individuals) in Kanpur Dehat to 46% (and 30%) in Vaishali, with Pratapgarh lying in the middle. Several factors may explain these differences. First, and perhaps most importantly, in Pratapgarh and Vaishali, the implementing partners have introduced innovations to enhance uptake; e.g. in Figure 1 Location of the three CBHI projects Pratapgarh, households were required to pay 30% of the annual premium on enrolment and the balance in eight equal interestfree instalments. In Vaishali, a discount was offered when several members of the same household enrol together. Finally, geographically, both Pratapgarh and Vaishali are located closer to urban areas compared with Kanpur Dehat, which means that health-care facilities are more proximate to these two locations (see Table 2 ). In Kanpur Dehat, the relatively lower supply of health-care services may explain lower interest in insurance.
Analysis of the determinants of enrolment is based on combining two data sources: (1) a baseline survey, and (2) information on actual enrolments, premium payments and claims, maintained by MIA's management information system (called 'Suchna'). The baseline survey which covered all eligible households included questions on socio-economic indicators, including demographic details of each household member, household consumption expenditures and household assets. In addition, data were collected on self-reported illness events, on the treatment sought and expenditure incurred. Information was also gathered on hospitalization or pregnancy in the 12 months preceding the survey. The analysis is based on 1294 households (417, 369 and 508 in Pratapgarh, Kanpur Dehat and Vaishali, respectively) and 7659 individuals (2562, 2239 and 2858 in Pratapgarh, Kanpur Dehat and Vaishali, respectively) for which valid data could be collected in the baseline survey and which were still alive/ present when the scheme was launched.
A description of the variables used, and summary statistics, is provided in Table 2 . Summary statistics conditional on insurance status are shown in the supplementary data (Tables  A1-D1 and A2-D2). A comparison of key socio-economic variables across the three sites suggests that households in Kanpur Dehat are somewhat better off as compared with their counterparts in Pratapgarh and Vaishali. For instance, average monthly per capita expenditure is higher by more than 50% compared with the other sites. The majority are self-employed in agriculture (66%) when in the other locations casual wage work dominates (about 40%). However, Kanpur Dehat appears to be less well served in terms of access to health services when travel time to the nearest inpatient facility is considered: almost two hours from Kanpur Dehat compared with 44 min from Pratapgarh and 29 min from Vaishali. Access to outpatient care is more readily accessible in all three locations (12-20 min) and differences across the three districts are not material.
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Estimating enrolment
Affiliation to CBHI is voluntary and contributory. Therefore, we assume that some households that are offered the opportunity to affiliate would decline. We estimate the probability of enrolment considering various factors that are likely to influence both the demand for health insurance and for health care in the context of the three CBHI schemes in question. Since insurance was offered at the household level, we first estimate a household-level enrolment specification. However, in practice, 
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since households selected which members would be insured, we also estimate an individual-level specification. Based on these considerations the insurance enrolment status of household h in location j, may be written as,
where, CBHI hj is a binary variable with a value of 1 if at least one member of a household is enrolled in the CBHI scheme, and 0 otherwise. Socio-economic status (SES) is a set of variables that includes caste, age, gender, education and employment status of the head of the household and the expenditure quintile in which a household falls. Specifically, to assess the effect of economic conditions on enrolment, households were grouped into quintiles based on their monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) (excluding illness-related expenditures). FIRP (formal health insurance and risk-pooling) includes access to formal health insurance notably RSBY enrolment status, type of family (joint or nuclear), size of household and whether incomes are pooled within a household. This set of variables also includes current household monthly per capita financial liabilities (debt) which may provide an idea of a household's ability to borrow and cope with ill-health but it may also reflect the vulnerability of a household. To assess the effects of supply side (SS) factors we include two variables-travel time to the nearest inpatient and outpatient facility. Finally, to account for the incidence of past and potential illnesses on enrolment status we include a set of variables indicating the total number of past health events (HE) (short-term illnesses, long-term illnesses, hospitalization) experienced by members of the household and variables to capture the age profile of the household (presence of children younger than 12 years and adults older than 65 years).
To explore intra-household resource allocation we turn to an individual specification where the enrolment status of individual i in household h in location j, may be written as,
where, in addition to most of the variables included in (1) we add a set of individual traits (I) such as SHG member, age, gender, marital status, education, employment status, relation to head of household, individual illness events and self-assessed health status (SAHS). 11 Since SAHS is only available for individuals aged 13 years and above, we estimate variants of (2) with and without imposing this age restriction. Both (1) and (2) are estimated using a logit specification. In the case of (2), standard errors allow for intra-household correlations.
Results
Household-level marginal effect estimates based on a logit specification are provided in Table 3 while individual-level estimates are provided in Tables 4 and 5 . Estimates are provided for all three locations separately and also for the pooled data.
Household-level estimates
Belonging to an economically and socially disadvantaged community (SC/ST) increased affiliation to the CBHI by 13 percentage points in Pratapgarh, but was statistically insignificant in the other two sites. 12 It is perhaps more important to state that in none of the three locations was there any evidence that low-caste communities were less likely to join a CBHI scheme. The effect of economic conditions of households on affiliations was analysed by grouping households into quintiles based on their monthly per capita consumption expenditure (excluding illness-related expenditures). In Pratapgarh, the households within the second and third quintile were substantially more likely to enrol (about 18-22 percentage points) as compared with the lowest quintile. In the other two sites there is no evidence that the poorest are less likely to enrol as compared with other quintiles. Other characteristics which indicate a household's socio-economic status are the education and occupation of its household head. While there is some evidence that household heads with some primary education, as compared with those who are illiterate, are more likely to join a CBHI scheme, the effect is restricted to Vaishali. Occupational status seems to have no bearing on insurance status. The main point emerging from this set of variables ('SES') is that the evidence does not suggest that the CBHI scheme is inaccessible even to the poorest households living in some of the poorest parts of rural India. Turning to the set of variables clustered under FIRP, we find that belonging to a joint family or a larger household has no bearing on CBHI uptake. However, intra-household pooling of income, which is an indicator of risk-pooling and can help smooth consumption in the event of a shock, exerts a negative and large effect on enrolment. Households engaged in such pooling are about 11 percentage points less likely to join insurance with the effects emanating mainly from Pratapgarh (30 percentage point effect) and Kanpur Dehat (19 percentage point). In Vaishali the effect is also negative but small and statistically insignificant. Household financial liabilities may indicate household ability to access credit, which may have a negative effect on CBHI enrolment. On the other hand it may also be interpreted as a signal of inability to deal with past shocks through informal risk-pooling and hence the need for borrowing and in turn may have a positive effect on enrolment.
Indeed, in two of the three sites, high household debt is positively linked to CBHI uptake. In Pratapgarh, a one standard deviation increase in financial liability (about Rs 500) is associated with a 7.2 percentage point increase (500 Â 0.0154). In the case of Vaishali the figure is about 8.2 percentage points (1150 Â 0.00711). Given the lack of development of credit markets in rural India and the usurious interest rates often charged by money lenders, outstanding household debt seems to increase risk aversion and to increase the demand for insurance. The effect of this variable highlights the need for financial protection and the need for further development of insurance markets in rural India. Finally, we see that household access to RSBY has no effect on CBHI uptake. Even in Vaishali where almost half the population is enrolled in RSBY, there is no effect on uptake. This finding supports the view that at least in the case of the schemes under analysis, national-level insurance schemes and community-based schemes are viewed as complementary in ensuring financial protection and access to health care.
While there are substantial differences in access to health services across sites, the two variables included in the specification to capture access to inpatient and outpatient care suggest that such considerations do not play a role in influencing insurance uptake. This may seem surprising but may be a feature of the participatory approach to choosing health-care plans. Since the plans cover transportation cost, at least in two sites, it is possible that this feature works towards reducing the potentially negative effect of accessibility on insurance uptake.
Turning to the effect of the incidence of past illnesses on insurance uptake we find that except for hospitalization, which increases the probability of enrolling in health insurance by 10 percentage points in Kanpur Dehat, there is no evidence that household decision-making is motivated by previous illness. However, households with children seem to be more risk averse and/or expect a higher need for health care and subsequently more likely to want to join insurance. The marginal effects are large (17 to 20 percentage point increase) in Pratapgarh and Vaishali. Finally, the marginal effect of older individuals in the family is negative (7 percentage points) and for the sample as a whole, statistically significant.
Individual-level estimates
Though we intended to apply 'en bloc' affiliation (i.e. all SHG household members would enrol together), in practice this was not followed, as households claimed that paying premiums for all members was too onerous. As we have seen, there is no evidence that even the poorest households are dissuaded from enrolling due to economic considerations, but there may well be systematic disparities within a household which lead to the exclusion of the aged, as well as the systematic inclusion of some members (children, those with poor health conditions). To explore these patterns, two variants of (2) are estimated. One of these is for the full sample and a second is restricted to the household members aged 13 years and above, since we only have information on self-assessed health status for such individuals.
The inclusion of the additional individual traits does not alter any of the earlier findings made based on the household-level estimates. There are several points which may be gleaned from (continued) these estimates. As may be expected and as the programme design requires, for the overall sample, SHG members are about 20 percentage points more likely to enrol in the scheme as compared with non-SHG members. With regard to intrahousehold priorities, across all three sites we see that household heads are substantially more likely (25 to 28 percentage points higher) to be covered as compared with 'other' household members (parents of head, siblings of the household head, spouses of siblings, in-laws of head, other relatives, nonrelatives). Spouses of household heads, who are predominantly female and SHG members, 13 are 19 to 27 percentage points more likely to be covered as compared with 'others'. Notably, female children of the household head are as likely to be enrolled, if not more, as compared with their male counterparts (20 to 25 percentage points higher for female children and 18 to 22 percentage points higher for male children as compared with 'others'). Spouses of children of household head receive less priority as compared with the household head and his spouse, although more than other relatives, while grandchildren seem to be at the same level as 'other' members. The pattern supports the idea that vertical relationships tend to receive greater priority in terms of coverage as compared with horizontal and that the household head and his spouse receive the greatest priority within a household. With regard to previous episodes of illness, while there are some instances, especially in Pratapgarh where individuals who have experienced short-or long-term illnesses during the baseline survey are more likely to be insured (5 to 6 percentage points higher), overall, it does not seem that such events play a large role in determining who is insured within a household. Estimates in Table 5 which control for illness events and selfassessed health status also do not support the idea that individuals with lower health status are more likely to be insured.
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Conclusions
In India, illness-related expenditures have been identified as a key factor responsible for impoverishing vulnerable households. In the absence of a national insurance system covering all persons in the informal sector, CBHI has been proposed as a viable mechanism to achieve some degree of financial protection. This article analysed the factors that determine insurance uptake in three CBHI schemes that have been rolled out in two Indian states since 2011.
Affiliation to the CBHI schemes is offered to households and all their members through women's self-help groups. While focusing on such a target group limits the generalizability of our findings it also permits a focus on low-income groups. Indeed, since women participating in SHGs are typically from lower-income groups, this roll-out model is by design less susceptible to social exclusion on the basis of low income or low caste. Also, since CBHI is offered to groups who have come together for a different purpose, extending the social links that have already been established for other purposes (e.g. membership in SHG) reduces both the potential and the practical occurrence of adverse selection.
This article yielded several clear insights. There are sharp differences in uptake across the three sites, and we saw that local innovations in the business process, such as deferred payment plans and discounts for bulk purchases, created more attractive conditions for affiliation to the specific CBHI schemes. These innovations were possible because each CBHI was governed by its members, who were also involved in the design of benefit packages, pricing and claims settlement. Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1 Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
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Another noteworthy insight is that, only at one of the sites did we find evidence that a household's economic position (as indicated by monthly per capita expenditure) limited the propensity to join the CBHI. Nor do any of the other socioeconomic related variables, e.g. education and occupational status, limit access to the local CBHI scheme. Indeed, in the case of one of the schemes, SC/ST households are more likely to enrol. Additionally, based on the finding that past illnesses and self-assessed health status did not influence insurance uptake, we conclude that adverse selection is not a major issue. These two findings are in marked contrast to the bulk of the literature, as reviewed in Mebratie et al. (2012) , which shows that often the lowest-income groups are excluded from CBHI schemes (in 9 out of 14 cases) and that individuals suffering from pre-existing health conditions/poor health are more likely to join CBHI schemes (in six out of seven cases).
Access to existing formal insurance and risk pooling mechanisms has a bearing on uptake; households that were better protected against financial risks through income pooling within their family network were less likely to enrol. On the other hand, households with greater financial liabilities found CBHI more attractive, and interestingly, enrolment in RSBY did not reduce enrolment to CBHI. Together these two aspects highlight (1) the need for greater development of self-governed and context-relevant insurance solutions that respond to perceived priorities of the population living and working in rural India; and (2) the importance of designing benefit packages which can complement existing insurance schemes.
14 In terms of allocating household resources to pay the CBHI premium, there is a clear pecking order, with household head and spouse of the household head occupying the top slots, followed by their children-both male and female. There is no evidence that female children are less likely to be covered as compared with male children. Siblings of household heads and their wives are far less likely to be covered. These patterns suggest that access to CBHI reflects subtle intra-household prioritization decisions, which cannot simply be explained by generalities such as income, age and gender-related exclusion.
Based on the analysis reported here, we conclude that offering CBHI through women's SHGs mitigates common concerns that CBHI might be unsustainable or not sufficiently inclusive. Given the pan-Indian spread of SHGs, providing demand-driven and context-adapted CBHI schemes through SHGs and similar groups may be potentially an effective channel to scale up affordable access to health care through health insurance among India's rural poor.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health, Policy and Planning online.
the community members choose a benefit package based on their family needs and based on discussions with their family members. Thereafter, the community members come together and mutually decide (sometimes on the basis of voting) on a single benefit package. This multiple-round exercise also enhances their knowledge of the CBHI scheme. 9 Data collection was subcontracted to a professional data collection company, Sigma Research and Consulting; MIA supervised the collection process together with the implementing partner NGO. Approximately 20% of the questionnaires, randomly chosen, were verified in the field, and questionnaires re-administered, if needed. Data was electronically captured and verified in the field. Hard copies of the completed questionnaires are retained by MIA. 10 The average distance to the nearest inpatient facilities is 9 km in the case of Pratapgarh, 44 km in the case of Kanpur Dehat and 4 km in Vaishali. For outpatient care, the corresponding figures are 1.7, 5.2 and 1.5 km for Pratapgarh, Kanpur Dehat and Vaishali, respectively. 11 Health status is rated as good, moderate or bad. In cases where individuals were not present, a household member provided a response. 12 SC/STs comprise 70% and 60% of the poorest 20% of the monthly per capita expenditure distribution in Pratapgarh and overall. 13 Ninety-four per cent of the spouses of the household head are female and of them 91% are members of an SHG. 14 At the moment the government is examining the possibility of extending access to outpatient care through the RSBY programme (see MoLE/GIZ 2012).
